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Facts and Hypotheses
1. | After two and a half decades of prosperous postwar development,
I western industrialised countries recently experienced a
slowdown of economic growth and productivity advance together
•; with an increase in the rates of inflation and unemployment.
i
j The deep recession of 1974/75 has uncovered fundamental
\
\ structural weaknesses; since then, the advanced economies
I have not regained the momentum of the 1960s. In this paper,
we shall attempt to contribute to a better understanding of
this malaise. But as our comparative advantage is not in
growth-accounting and as we do not believe that we can
single out one or two specific "causes", we shall merely aim
at forming an idea (perhaps only a rather vague one) which
might be further developed into a paradigm or research pro-
gramme (in Lakatos' sense) . "
*Paper presented at the 1982 Conference of the Royal Economic
Society "Reasons for the Recent Productivity Slow-Down in
Advanced Economies", London, July 22 . .This working paper
is the basis for an abbreviated version to be published in
the Economic Journal. We would like to thank colleagues at
the Institut fur Weltwirtschaft, in particular Klaus-Werner
Schatz and Frank Weiss, for helpful comments on an earlier
draft.
1
The methodology of scientific research programmes has been
developed by Lakatos (1968; 1970) for analyses in the natural
sciences. An adaptation of this methodology for social
sciences is due to Latsis (1976).- 2 -
In a more positive sense, we are looking for .a kind of
diagnosis that could help us to identify early indicators of
a turnaround or a few policy variables which could be
included in a programme for faster growth and productivity
advance. Although we shall focus on what can be measured,
complying with the standards of the guild ,, we shall not
retrain from considering complex relationships which can be
grasped only intuitively, even if they include phenomena
2
which lie beyond the limits of official statistics . The
outcome may be "soft economics", but we find some consola-
tion in the dictum that it is better to be vaguely right
than to be precisely wrong.
2. .Productivity growth - the development of real output per
unit of all or of specific inputs - is hard to measure
accurately. Inputs as well as outputs are subject to
qualitative and quantitative changes and there are serious
difficulties in defining what the "real" magnitudes are when
relative prices greatly vary over a longer period of time.
This caveat holds for the growth of. total factor productivity
as well as for the relatively simple concept of single factor
productivity, notably labour productivity, to which this
paper is limited for lack of a comprehensive set of data on
capital stocks available to us...
3. The empirical basis covers the experience or 14 OECD-countries
from the early 1960s to the late 1970s at the level of country
aggregates and for major sectors. To eliminate or at least
deemphasize cyclical changes (labour hoarding in mild recessions
1 • ; .' . . ,
For a critical view see Barba'sh (1982) .
2 " • ' • ' • -••••.- ••
This comes close to Hayek's notion of the limits of measure-
ment in the analysis of 'phenomena of organized complexity'.
See Hayek (1964; 1975).- 3 -
and better utilisation of the stock of employed labour in
upswings), we measure average productivity advance from peak
to peak. The countryspecific benchmark years are enumerated
in the Annex.
4. From this statistical information (Table 1) we can immediately
draw two factual inferences :
(1) In all countries, except Norway,,the growth of labour
productivity significantly declined from the early to the
late seventies. Even in Norway the productivity performance
deteriorated relative to the 1960s.
(2) The productivity slowdown, measured as the percentage
shortfall of the average growth rate of labour productivity
in the late 1970s (from 1973/74 to 1979/80) relative to the
performance before, was great in Canada, Sweden and the
United States and small in Norway and Germany.
Hence the productivity slowdown appears to be a phenomenon
common to all advanced countries. They all were apparently
subject to a similar disease or shock although some countries
fared better than others in the new circumstances. What is
the explanation?
5. This productivity puzzle has provoked a plethora' of empirical
research, albeit mainly concentrated on the United States.
The most comprehensive efforts employ a growth accounting
framework. Among these, the recent contributions of Denison
(1979) and Kendrick and Grossman (1980) stand out. Denison
concludes from his study tor the United States that the
mystery basically remains unresolved. In fact, one may
1
The figures in Table 1 include government services whose'
output and hence productivity is extremely difficult to
measure. In many countries, the growth of labour productivity
in the public sector is implicitly assumed to be zero by
estimating output of government services as a linear function
of labour input. In other countries like Germany, the growth
of productivity in the public sector is arbitrarily determined
by the statistical authorities (in the German case slightly
above 1 per cent annually for recent years). The general
picture presented in Table 1, however, holds also for
aggregates excluding the public sector. See below.- 4 -
Table 1 - The Growth of Labour Productivity in Selected
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Source: Calculated from OECD, National Accounts Statistics, Paris,
var. iss. - OECD, Labour Force Statistics, Paris, var.
iss. - IMF, International Financial Statistics, Yearbook
1981, Washington, 1981. - Sachverstandigenrat zur Begut-
achtung der gesamtwirtschaftlichen Entwicklung, Mut zur
Stabilisierung, Jahresgutachten 1973/74, Stuttgart und Mainz
Kohlhammer, 1973. - Economic Report of the President.
Transmitted to the Congress February 1982, Washington, 19 82.
- ILO, Yearbook of Labour Statistics, 1965.- 5 -
question whether growth accounting, even if conducted most
thoroughly as it has been, will ever lead to an adequate
solution. As Nelson (1981) has explained in his stock-taking
of the state of the art in productivity analysis, growth
accounting cannot adequately cope with
- the issue of complementarity among the factors of produc-
tion (long recognized as the imputation problem in the
history of economic analysis) ,
- the influence of variables not incorporated in the under-
lying theoretical model, and
- the nature of economic growth as a disequilibrium process.
We have the feeling that Nelson is essentially right and
have come to believe that the disequilibrium point is most
relevant in the present context.
For properly understanding the factors behind the recent
productivity performance it seems necessary to recall that
the slowdown occurred after a long phase of rapid economic
development in North America, Western Europe, and Japan
alike. This suggests as a central hypothesis that the recent
slack in the__growth of labour productivity reflects^Johe
erosion of many of the favourable conditions which contributed
to the long spurt o£_economic development in the West after
World War II. To specify this idea we proceed to submit a
tentative list of possible explanations, simply based on
2 casual empiricism or theoretical considerations .
(1) From the increasing concern about the underground
economy we infer that output statistics may under-
estimate the real performance of advanced economies.
The main explanation for the productivity slowdown, as





The items on the list are, of course, not mutually
exclusive.- 6 -
(2) There is also reason to think that manufacturing
was and still is the leading factor in productivity
growth and that the productivity slowdown is related to
the development towards a post-industrial society
(Hypothesis II). .
(3) Productivity advance in manufacturing, construction,
and elsewhere can have slowed down because workers
reduced their effort in order to increase it in leisure
activities, including activities which are close substi-
tutes for household expenditures on goods and services
(Hypothesis III).
(4) As the slowdown in productivity advance goes hand in
hand with a slowdown in income growth per capita we
must also consider whether what we observe is not a ..
slowdown in the demand for income in terms of effort .
After.having experienced such' a fast rise in their
consumption levels workers may feel saturated for a
while and may increasingly prefer job security instead
of income growth (Hypothesis IV).
(5) In a more general way, the income elasticity of
demand for security may have become high in the period
of growth acceleration, perhaps based on illusions
about the real dynamic costs of social security
(Hypothesis V).
(6) Similarly, when rapid growth was taken for granted,
almost as a kind ,of public good, societies developed an
increasing demand for equity and equality , without
fully realizing its costs in terms of economic
efficiency and growth performance later on (Hypothesis
VI) .
(7) Had the productivity slowdown occurred only in Europe
and Japan we would place the major emphasis on the
presumption that it marked the end of a technological
catching up process (Hypothesis VII).
1
This concept goes back to Robbins (1930) and the literature
quoted on p. 123 ibid, which includes passages from Dalton,
Robertson and Wicksteed.
2
See Okun (1975) .- 7 -
(8) However, as the productivity slowdown also occurred
in North America we must add a question about techno-
logical advance at the best practice frontier: Have
firms in the U.S. suffered so much from the loss of
their technological monopoly positions that they feel
no longer sufficiently strong to take innovative risks
at the previous rate, while firms in Europe and Japan
were not yet ready to assume the role of technological
pioneers, so that the world is faced with a techno-
logical stalemate (Hypothesis VIII)?
(9) As the productivity slowdown in the West came after a
spurt it may merely indicate a return to normality,
perhaps combined with some overshooting on the low
side. The question then is what produced the accelera-
tion in the first place? Apart from post-war recon-
struction, the major candidate is the policy innovation
of demand management, successfully applied in the U.S.
in the 1960s (Hypothesis IX).
(10) The advance of labour productivity slowed down more
than the growth of the capital/labour ratio . This
raises the question why the gross additions to the
capital stock became less efficient in all countries
under observation for more reasons than those covered
by Hypotheses VII to IX. One possibility would be capital
waste due to inflation and an inflation induced decline
in the real rate of interest (Hypothesis X).
(11) A further explanation for the decline in capital
efficiency could be the drastic changes in relative
prices which occured in the wake of rapid growth in the
early 1970s - higher costs for the environment,
exhaustible resources and energy, including oil
(Hypothesis XI).
(12) Capital productivity may have also suffered from a
systematic misallocation of investment in the sense
that some firms and some forms of investment proved to
be too attractive because governments intervened more
and showed a bias in favour of large firms when it came
to promotion measures and of less efficient industries
when it came to import protection (Hypothesis XII).
1
For evidence see OECD (1980, p. 48- 8 -
(13) With regard to labour we have to look for similar
inefficiencies: Has the quality of labour deteriorated,
perhaps because of declining educational standards or
of a massive increase of the share of inexperienced
labour in total employment (Hypothesis XIII)?
(14) All this may not account for the significant inter-
national differences in the slowdown of labour produc-
tivity which are evident from Table 1. Could these
differences be related to differences in wage behaviour




7. Evidence for the drastic change of the conditions governing
the growth of labour productivity since the early 1970s is
presented in Table 2 . Whether we relate the growth of labour
productivity per employed person - on Cobb-Douglas account -
to the growth of the capital-labour ratio or - on Verdoorn
account - to the growth of real output, a fit which is highly
2
satisfactory for the period from 1960 to 1973 , fails to be
so for 1973 to 1979. The correlation with the capital-labour
ratio even ceases to be statistically significant.
1
Irrespective of whether labour productivity was measured in
terms of the number of persons employed or of the number of
hours worked, we obtained similar results from corresponding
calculations for the non-farm business sector, performed on
data given in OECD (1980) for samples of up to 12 countries.
2
In case of the Cobb-Douglas function, the estimated coefficient
obviously reflects the influence of more factors than capital.
Therefore, from the above regressions one can only conclude
that the set of all forces which is proxied by the growth
of the capital- labour ratio has lost its influence in the
late 1970s._ 9 -
Table 2 - The Growth of Labour Productivity in Industry Related
to the Growth of the,Capital Labour Ratio and Real








IIE = 1.520 + 0.810 CL
(0.150)*
IIE = 0.675 + 0.435 CL
•(0.255)
HE = 1.338 + 0.649 OUT
(0.140)*




















*Significant at 5 p.c. level; standard errors in parantheses.
Mining and quarrying; manufacturing; electricity, gas and
water; construction. - Symbols: nE = real output per employee;
CL = capital labour ratio (non-farm business sector); OUT = real
output. All variables are expressed as average rates of growth
over the period under inspection. - Austria, Belgium, Canada,
Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Netherlands,
Norway, Sweden, United Kingdom, United States. -
Except Austria, Denmark, Netherlands, Norway.
Source: Calculated from OECD, National Accounts Statistics
Paris, var. iss.; OECD, Labour Force Statistics,
Paris, var. iss.; OECD, 1980.- 10 -
What is known about the underground economy (Hypothesis I)
seems to contribute little to explaining this puzzle, although
there are empirical studies suggesting that these activities
have grown over time, particularly during the 1970s, and may
be now quite significant. . In most official national income
calculations underground activities are ignored, except in
Italy and a few other countries where underground output has
been estimated. Apart from this, such output estimates do
not help
; if we still lack the corresponding input estimates.
Against this one could argue that unrecorded output was
based on unrecorded input so that the effects on measured
productivity should cancel out. Not quite so, however, in a
period when increasing tax burdens (Table 3) - particularly
in Sweden, Norway, the Netherlands, and Belgium, less so in
North America - create more and more incentives to divert
inputs which still remain recorded to producing unrecorded
2 output . For the same reason, overstating of expenses may
3 have become more common over time . Finally, the productivity
performance of labour employed in the observed economy is
likely to suffer once a second job is taken up. But as the
underground economy is still so much beyond the limits of
1 - • •
According to Langfeldt (1982) , in Germany the (monetary)
unobserved sector seems to have grown from roughly 2 per
cent of gross national product in the early 1960s to
roughly 14 per cent in the late 1960s and 27 per cent in
1980. Feige's (1980) estimates tor the United States reveal
similar magnitudes. See also Tanzi (1980); Contini (1981);
Isachen, Kloveland, Str<6m (1981); Kirchgassner (1981);
Frey, Week, Pommerehne (1982).
2 • . ••• _ • .•;'••''
There is evidence that marginal tax rates increased more
rapidly than the tax burdens shown in Table 3. For details
see the individual country studies in Walker and Block
(forthcom.).
3
Evidence on the decline in tax moral in Germany and the
United States is presented in Frey et al. (1982, pp. 11-2).- 11 -
Table 3 - Taxes and Social Security Contributions in p.c.

















.respectively; see Annex. -





































































Source: OECD, National Accounts of OECD-Countries,
var. iss.- 12 -
reliable estimates and as we know even less about its impact
on measured productivity, we have to put Hypothesis I aside.
This does not exclude the possibility that some of the factors
behind the underground economy may also have contributed to
the productivity slowdown. These factors will come up in
connection with other hypotheses.
9. Shifts in the intersectoral composition of output and employ-
ment (Hypothesis II) are likely to be a significant factor
in the explanation of the productivity slowdown for the
following reasons: ?
(a) In the 19b0s and 1960s, in the advanced economies
of the,West the industrial sector had developed rapidly
and had attracted resources from agriculture. This had
raised overall productivity as there is a high differential
between the levels of productivity in agriculture and
in manufacturing (Table 4). In addition, agriculture
itself had been forced to concentrate on mechanisation
and other measures to raise the productivity of land
and labour. In the 1970s, these stimuli for productivity
growth weakened. The rate of displacement of labour
from agriculture decreased markedly; at the same time,
except for Finland and Austria, the scope for rapid
productivity advances in this sector obviously narrowed
down (Table 5.) .
(b) The 1970s witnessed an acceleration in the growth of
employment in government services. As government services
exhibit a distinctly below average level of productivity
in all countries investigated this development had a
negative impact on measured productivity growth.
(c) When in the course of the 1960s the relative growth of
manufacturing came to an end, private and public services
turned out to be the only, sectors which were to expand
their share in employment . Measured productivity growth
1 . • , .•
Due to a variety of factors, productivity measurement in
services is much less reliable than in manufacturing. For
details on these and other difficulties in measuring
productivity see e.g. Mark (1981).Table 4 - Relative Labour Productivity and Share of Employment of Major Economic Sectors in Selected Industrial Economies
Country
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employed for total economy
in 1970












































United Kingdom 0.93 0.88 1.11
Sweden 0.57 1.17 0.77
Norway 0.55 1.06 1.11




Belgium 0.80 1.07 0.99
Germany 0.42 1.10 0.99
France 0.56 1.16 1.02
Italy 0.50 1.12
b 1.13
Japan 0.35 1.32 0.97
Related to the private business sector,
and defense. -












































































































































Including mining. - Including community services. - Public administration
Source: OECD (1980,Tables 8 and 10).Table 5 - The Growth of Labour Productivity in Selected OECD-Countries by Major Sector,









































































































































































a b Value added in constant prices per employee. - For countryspecific benchmark years see














































Source: Calculated from OECD, National Accounts Statistics, Paris, var. iss.; OECD, Labour Force Statistics,
Paris, var. iss.; IMF, International Financial Statistics, Yearbook 1981, Washington, 1981.- 15 -
in these sectors always fell short of that in industry or
agriculture . Hence, the increasing weight of services
in the employment structure must have had a negative
effect on measured overall productivity growth.
The structural shifts among agriculture, industry and services
have thus indeed contributed to the decline of measured
productivity advance in western countries. However, they are
far from being capable of explaining the entire post-1973
2
productivity development as we conclude from shift and
share analyses (OECD, 1980, pp. 33-44; Fels, Schmidt, 1981,
pp. 109-111) and from the observation that the productivity
slowdown is a phenomenon common to all sectors (Table 5).
10. Hypotheses III through VI have the common feature that they
attribute the slowdown of productivity to shifts in pre-
ferences. If these shifts could be taken as an expression of
1
This may well be a statistical illusion due to estimating
real output in various services from input indices or con-
structing the real output series as Laspeyres indices. But
it is also true that larger parts of the service sector are
sheltered from international competition and, therefore,
under less pressure for reducing costs and improving pro-
ductivity. Furthermore, many services in fields like health,
insurance, banking or transport, which exhibit features of
cartelization, partly due to guild ethics and partly to
public regulation, and services in the public sector, which
are not exposed to the penalties and the rewards ot the
market, have grown particularly fast. On the other hand,
new technologies based on microelectronics make the notion
questionable that productivity advance in services is by
necessity weak because of the technological structure of
these activities (Baumol, 1967; Baumol and Oates, 1975,
Chapters 16,17).
2
This levelling oft does not exclude that structural change
among and within firms has levelled off as a driving force
as well. It could well be the case in times of increasing
protection for activities which exhibit a relatively low
level of productivity.- 16 •-
the unconstrained will of people to work less or less hard,
to have more 'leisure on the job
1 , to be content with their
level of (present and future) consumption, or to build up a
comprehensive system of security against individual economic
risks, -the productivity slowdown would have to be taken as a
revealed preference, perhaps a natural development in a
mature economy: nothing to bother about. However, there are
some observations which make us hesitate to submitting a
"natural rate hypothesis" in this context. First, the very
emergence of the underground economy is an indication that
there is little driving force behind the move towards a
leisure society, once the wedge between the marginal product
and the private income earned for it disappears. Second, the
notion that people in advanced countries are now fairly
saturated with regard to their consumption targets finds as
little supporting evidence as Keynes
1 famous psychological
law in past decades. With regard to specific consumer goods,
evidence on saturation refers to quantities rather than
qualities, and the permanent flow of product innovation
makes saturation a shaky concept . Third, we still observe
trade unions pressing hard for higher incomes. Fourth, there
are reasons to :believe that the increasing redistribution
(which is reflected in the fact that the 'income elasticities'
of the transfer system exceed unity in all countries under
inspection (Table 6)) may just as well result from a supply
push if one considers that the Keynesian emphasis on overall
demand, on the danger of oversaving and on government
spending greatly widened the scope for politicians to offer
transfer benefits in their competition for votes in the
political market.
11. It is true that the rise of the welfare state could also be
interpreted as revealing a collective preference for more
1
See Schmidt (1977).- 17
Table 6 - The Growth of Public Transfers in Selected




















































































Countryspecific peak-year; see Annex. - Derived from loga-
rithmic time series regressions between public transfers and
gross domestic product in current prices for the period from
the mid 1960s (countryspecific peak year or earliest,year for
which datafare available) to 1979. -
 C1978. - 1968. -
e1977. -
 r1965.
Source; Calculated from OECD, National Accounts for OECD-
Countries, var. iss. *- 18 -
security or more equality at the expense of faster income
growth ; but did people know in advance, or correctly assess,
what an extensive transfer system would cost them in terms
of reduced performance motivation and hence productivity
advance, given human nature and its propensity to make the
best use of whatever opportunities a system offers to its
2
individual participants? The question is not as far beside
the point as it may appear at first sight, since the quest
for social equality and security may well have been the
natural outgrowth of the rapid advances achieved in the
3
1960s built upon the double illusion (i) that its static
costs would be negligeable and (ii) that it would not have a
negative effect on productivity advance. A collective
venture, initiated in a period of accelerated growth which
looks like a miracle in retrospect, may after a while produce
4 a fundamental shift in people's mentality as if the miraculous
conditions could be simply taken for granted. This is a
disequilibrium hypothesis with an implicit warning against
extrapolating favourable developments or conditions with a
high rent content, such as the growth stimuli of demand
1
We note in this context a (social) policy catching up process
The 'income elasticities' of the transfer system tend to be
the higher the lower the initial ratio of public transfers
to gross domestic product (Spearman coefficient of rank
correlation: - 0.71; in this correlation the Netherlands
are excluded because in their case the period of observation
is not comparable to that for the other countries).
2 * . " ' . ...-.




See Boltho (1982, p. 149).
4
Maddison (1982, p. 13) reports that "sickness absenteeism
represents 10 per cent of working time in the Netherlands
where benefits are generous, but only 2.5 per cent in the
U.S.A. where they are much smaller". See also Grubel (1982,
p. 25) on Germany and Sweden.- 19 -
management, the integration of international markets
(Giersch, 1970, pp. 11-2 ) or the sudden availability of an
exhaustible resource. In a society which takes a positive-
sum-game for granted, a negative-sum-game is likely to be
played after a zero-sum-mentality (Thurow, 1980) has had
time to develop .
12. The disincentives associated with such a negative-sum-game
would tend to impair the advance of labour productivity
mainly by discouraging investment. Indeed, investment per-
formance in the late 1970s was worse than in the previous
period, except for Canada, the United Kingdom and Norway,
the nouveaux riches de l'energie among the advanced countries
(Table 7). Nonetheless, this alone can hardly be taken to
2
fully explain the productivity slowdown . Yet the quality of
the additions to the capital stock may have declined,
perhaps due to a slowdown in the flow of product or process
innovations resulting from a depletion of technological
1
While social consensus is an economic resource in a
democratic society, the struggle over the income distribu-
tion is - like war - a negative factor in economic develop-
ment. Fast growth is good for social consensus since it
makes people on the lower income strata feel sure that it
will take them only a short time to catch up with what
higher income ranks earn today; but when income growth
slows down, the catching-up time can become hopelessly
long. Then envy will find an outlet in hate rather than in
competitive effort, and the consensus may break down unless
governments can redirect emotions towards other collective
goals.
2
This is not controversial in the literature on the produc-
tivity slowdown; it is also evident from the calculations
presented in Table 2 which show that after 1973 inter-
national differences in the growth rates of labour pro-
ductivity are not susceptible to explanation by inter-
national differences in the growth of capital-labour
ratios.Table 7 - Gross Fixed Capital Formation Related to Gross Domestic Product and the Growth of the
Capital Stock In the Non-Farm Business Sector, Selected Industrial Countries,
































































































































Source: OECD, National Accounts Statistics, Paris, var. iss. - OECD (1980, Table 15).- 21 -
possibilities (Hypothesis VII and VIII) . This notion brings
us back to the stagnationists of the 1930s who believed that
the dearth of major new industries was one of the main reasons
2
for the economic malaise of their time (Hansen, 1941) and
presumed a theory of the mature economy which was completely
refuted by the fast economic growth of the 1950s and 1960s.
Nevertheless, there are certain indications to back the
hypothesis ot a technological stalemate for the 1970s.
(a) In the early 1970s, the technological gap between North
America and Western Europe (as well as Japan) had been
largely closed (Christensen, Cummings, and Jorgenson,
1980) . Competition in high-technology commodities on
domestic and world markets became fierce. For Western
Europe (and Japan) the end of the catching-up meant
that the import and adaptation of best practice tech-
nology dried up as a source of_economic growth and
productivity advance (Table 8) . For North America the
fact that other countries had caught up must have
implied a partial erosion of quasi rents derived from
superior technology and organization, notably in the
markets for capital intensive and skill intensive
manufactures.
1 • . • . .-. .,...-. •-•
The depletion hypothesis has been emphasized in a recent
study by Nordhaus (1981). In addition to technological
depletion, Nordhaus stresses the depletion of energy
resources, the depletion of investment opportunities in the
tradeables sector, the phasing out of structural changes
from agriculture to manufacturing, the slowdown of world'
trade. While he attributes two thirds of the: productivity
slowdown to these factors, he also casts some doubt on this
estimate (ibid., p. 24). ,
2
In addition to technology, the stagnationists stressed two
more factors: the decline of the rate of population growth
in the United States and the dwindling of investment
opportunities because of the (alleged) passing of the
economic frontier. In today's open world economy, these
arguments are still less convincing than in the 1930s, if
only for the high population growth and the severe capital
shortage in developing countries. For ^a criticism of the
stagnationists see Terborgh (1945) and the literature cited
therein (ibid, p.9).
3
For a similar conclusion see Kendrick (1981, pp. 156-66).- 22 -
Table 8 - The Technology Gap Hypothesis , International Cross Section ,

















Significant at 5 p:c. level;
Equation
= 31.122 - 6.564 In GAP 64• "
(1.047)*
=' 9.491 - 1.779 In GAP 73
(1.714)
= 25.330 - 4.868 In GAP 64
(1,692)*'
= 3.OO4-O.O19 In GAP 73
(2.244)












Symbols: TTE = Average annual growth rate of real output per employee over
the period under inspection; In = natural logarithm; GAP 64 or 73 = Per
capita income of individual sample country in p.c. of per capita income
of the United States in 1964 or 1973 (cpuntryspecific peak year; see Annex)
valued at purchasing power parities. - Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark,
Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, United
Kingdom. - Countryspecific peak years; see Annex. - Mining and quarrying;
manufacturing; electricity, gas and water; construction.
i
Source: Calculated from OECD, National Accounts Statistics, var. iss. -
OECD, Labour^Force Statistics, var. iss. - R. Summers, I.B. Kravis,
A. HestOn, International Comparison of Real Product and its Compo-
sition: 1950 - 1977, The Review of Income and Wealth, Series 26,
No.1, March 1980.
 v- 23 -
(b) At the same time, the speed at which the technological
frontier is shifting outward may have declined as is
suggested by the following observations: Over the first
three quarters of this century, the U.S. economy had an
average productivity advance (per employee) of 1.6 per
cent, but after 1973 an average of only 0.2 per cent
(Table 9) , a figure which is lower than that for any
other U.S. business cycle after World War II. The presumption
for a technological explanation finds support (i) in
Table 10 which shows that between the 1960s and the
1970s, RandD expenditures in the United States decreased
and did so even more than in other countries , and (ii)
in empirical studies which conclude that the productivity
of these expenditures declined recently (Griliches, 1980).
(c) According to Table 10 some countries like Japan,
Germany and Sweden are in a process of catching-up also
with regard to RandD expenditures. But this has not yet
been sufficient to stem the decline for the West as a
whole. Moreover, there is evidence that the relative
growth of RandD expenditures in Germany has not been
possible without a decline in its productivity (Fels,
Schmidt, 1981, Chapter III, part B).
13. On the other hand, casual evidence suggests that we are far
from being in the midst of a technological impasse. Micro-
electronics, biotechnology, new industrial materials
(graphite, polymere, ceramics etc.), among others, have
opened up new wide avenues for technological development and
are continuing to do so. Griliches (1980, p. 347) maintains
that "all substantial surveys of new technologies and new
technological possibilities seem to contradict the notion
that we have exhausted our innovation possibilities".
Empirically, Griliches could not detect a major impact of
recent RandD performance on the productivity slowdown in the
U.S. His conclusion that RandD performance was a consequence
rather than a cause of the worsening of the growth climate
is quite plausible to us. It supports an acceleration-
deceleration hypothesis.
1
. It need not be stressed that this ratio is a weak indicator
for innovativeness as the efficiency of RandD outlays as
well as the lag between input and output may widely vary
over time.Table 9 ~ The Growth of Labour Productivity and of Employment in the United States,
1900-1981 (average annual rates of change)
Sector










































































































Source: U.S. Government, Economic Report of the President, 1982. - U.S. Department of Commerce,
Bureau of the Census, Historical Statistics of the United. States - Colonial Times to
1970, Part 1, Washington, D.C. 1975.- 25 -































































Source: OECD, Science and Technology indicators, Basic
Statistical Series, Volume;B, Gross National
Expenditure on RandD (GERD) 1963-1979, Paris, 1982- 26 -
14. This carries the discussion to the question whether the
productivity slowdown cannot be best explained by the
exhaustion of a policy potential (Hypothesis IX) rather than
a technological potential. What is at stake is the assertion
that the poor performance of the 1970s must be seen against
the background of a-policy-induced acceleration of economic
growth.and productivity advance in the. 1960s, and may be the
deferred price for it. . ......
 ;-
15. The productivity advance which the U.S. economy exhibited
between 1962 and 1966 was very rapid by past standards
(Table 9). We attribute it to the implementation of the
; Keynesian policy programme. With the claim that the economy
is manageable the Kennedy administration generated optimistic
: expectations for the returns on investment. This worked well
for several years, supported by elements of mutual causation
(positive feedback). These elements include
- the favourable influence of investment on overall demand,
capacity utilisation, profits and profit expectations,
- the favourable influence of investment on the age structure
and the productivity of the capital stock,
- the . favourable influence or (r"ast\relativelyj productivity
advance on unit labour costs, given adaptive expectations
in wage negotiations (a wage lag);
- the favourable influence of a high effective demand for
labour on attitudes towards technical progress, the inter-
industry and intra-industry division of labour in the
world economy, the degree of specialisation among firms in
general, and the exploitation of other potential sources
of productivity growth.
When efforts to repress price inflation failed and price
inflation accelerated under the impact of the Vietnam war
the scope for an accelerated productivity advance was ex-
hausted and mutual causation with a negative sign (vicious
circle) seems to have reduced productivity advance below the
long run trend (Table 9).- 27 -
16. Europe's productivity growth in the 1960s strongly bene-
fitted - as we observed above - from the possibilities of
cheaply importing U.S. technology (Table 8),. What is relevant
here is that the technological catching-up was accelerated
(i) by the high import demand in the U.S. economy which in
Europe induced an export-led growth process, supported by
the increasing undervaluation of European currencies vis a
vis the US-$, and (ii) that this undervaluation induced a
flow of direct investment from the U.S. to Europe. It was in
this way and in this period that a transatlantic dis-
equilibrium built up (Giersch, 1979).
17. Accelerated economic development on both sides of the
Atlantic boosted the demand for raw materials, energy,
including oil, and labour throughout the 1960s. Imports from
other countries expanded rapidly, and bottlenecks in European
labour markets were temporarily widened by massive immigration
from the Mediterranean region. In the course of time, strong
upward pressures on prices in the bottleneck areas - limits
to growth - made themselves felt.
18. These tensions and disproportionalities were to explode, in a
variety of shocks during the business cycle which began in
the late 1960s and ended with the worldwide boom of 1973.
The system of fixed exchange rates - the very pillar around
which the post-war western economic system had been built -
proved to be unsustainable. Excessive balance of trade
surpluses in Europe and the concomitant import of inflation
put strain on the exchange rate system. Also, trade unions
in Germany, hitherto the major source of stability in the
system, gave up their policy of wage restraint and pushed
into the scope given by the balance of payments situation.
As a consequence of the demand induced growth process in the
United States and Europe, which helped to bring about the
productivity acceleration, the western world saw itself
faced with (i) high and volatile rates of inflation, (ii)- 28 -
depressed real rates of interest, (iii) a quadrupling of oil
prices, (IV) a burst of raw material prices, (v) a massive
decline of employment in Germany and elsewhere in Europe,
(vi) a reversal of the acceleration in the growth of real
wages, i.e. a deceleration, or even a decline, in the
development of real- wages in the U.S. and Germany (Tables 9
and 11), and elsewhere in Europe.
19. The acceleration of inflation which started in the late
1960s and which was further fueled by efforts to accomodate
the drastic oil price rise through monetary and fiscal
expansion is likely to have depressed productivity growth in
various ways. First, despite occasional adjustment of the
tax system, inflation pushed people into higher tax brackets
This must have impaired work incentives, just as it often
led to the taxation of phantom profits. Second, with rising
inflation, the private opportunity cost of holding money
increased much beyond the social cost of supplying money,
which is tantamount to taxing the use of money as a pro-
duction factor and to inducing the substitution of other
resources (such as time) for money. Third, the fact that
inflation became more volatile must have further reduced the
signal to noise ratio in the information processing system
of the market. Finally, in the absence of index linked
.bonds, inflation diverted funds from productive investment
to the production of assets which were thought to be a good
hedge against inflation ("concrete gold", structures and
real estate) .
1 . .• ...• . .. •.- . •...,• .
See Giersch (1974 pp. 7-8); Feldstein (1982 pp. 8-13).- 29 -
Table n -- Employment, Wages, Productivity, Interest Rates, Consumer and
Producer Prices, and Terms of Trade Effects in the United States












































































































































Average annual rates of growth. - Geometric average of government bond yields
deflated by wholesale prices (Germany: prices for industrial products). -
 CTTE =
((l+GNIr) : (l+GDPr) - l) where GNIr = rate of growth of real gross national income
(defined as gross domestic product in constant prices minus net exports in constant
prices plus net exports in current prices deflated by implicit import prices);
GDPr = rate of growth of real gross domestic product (geometric average over yearly
rates of growth over the period under inspection).
Source: U.S. Department of Labour, Handbook of Labour Statistics 1979. - U.S.
Department of Labour, Monthly Labour Review, Vol. 103 (1980), No. 12,
pp. 32-9. - IMF, International Financial Statistics, var. iss. - OECD,
Main Economic Indicators, var. iss. - Sachverstandigenrat zur Begutachtung
der gesamtwirtschaftlichen Entwicklung, Jahresgutachten 1979/80 and 1981/82,
U.S. Government, Economic Report of the President, February 1982.- 30 -
20. Less noted in the context of the productivity slowdown but
more important in our view were the effects which the in-
flationary monetary policy had on the level of real interest
rates and hence on the ratio between real interest rates and
real wages (Hypothesis X). Table 11 shows for the U.S. and
West Germany that when inflation rates increased after 1969,
real interest rates dropped by 2-3 percentage points. When
the oil price shock was accomodated between 1973 and 1975
they further fell. Until the end of the 1970s they were
markedly below what had been customary in the 1960s in both
, . countries. While inflation was accelerating, expectations
obviously were biased by the experience of a less
inflationary past (adaptive expectations or a time lag on
the capital market). This seems to have depressed•real
interest rates_be 1 ow _their long-run equilibrium level which
we conjecture must have risen under the impact of energy
price induced obsolescence and uncertainty.
21. The opposite happened to real wages in Europe. Table 11
shows for Germany that real wages increased much faster than
output per hour in the early seventies, even if the positive
terms of trade effect is fully taken into account (as it; has
to be in an open economy to arrive at "distributable output").
Part of.this can be taken to reflect the adjustment process
that corrected the transatlantic disequilibrium of the 1960s
mentioned above. But there was more to it: unit labour costs
in real term^J^uxthejc^increased fr
oi5 1973 to 1975 when, in
addition, the terms of trade effect became negative. At
least for Germany and for some parts of Continental Europe,
we can interpret this distortion of real wages and real
interest rates and of the relation between them by advancing
the following three interrelated propositions, each of which
has a slightly different emphasis: (i) inflation, an accomo-
dating monetary policy, and depressed real rates of interest
limited the number of bankruptcies which were bound to occur
under the pressure of rising unit labour costs; (ii) depressed- 31 -
real rates of interest allowed real wages to rise faster and
to stay higher than would have been possible without creating
(even) more unemployment; (iii) with a given push of costs
from labour, energy, and raw materials, an accomodating or
inflationary monetary policy helped to prevent (more) unem-
ployment by lowering the costs of capital.
22. A similar cushioning effect is not observable for the U.S.
between 1969 and 1973 when the devaluation of the dollar and
the Nixon wage-price controls programme ("I am also a
Keynesian") led to an acceleration of productivity advance
in manufacturing - and a lag of real wages behind it - that
shows a striking similarity to the development under the
Kennedy-Johnson Administration. The decline of the real rate
of interest (by 3 percentage points as calculated in Table
11) must therefore have a connection with the rising prices
of food and raw materials. In this sense it obviously
cushioned a negative "supply shock" and contributed to the
strong rise of corporate profits in U.S. manufacturing
• between 1970 and 1973 .
23. After the oil price hike - during the 1973-1975 period -
the drop in the real rate of interest in the U.S. also
helped to support real wages, which continued to rise
although distributable output per hour absolutely declined.
Over the whole period from 1973 to 1979 real wage rates rose
slightly more than distributable output, while the real rate
of interest was negative on the average and was lower in
every subperiod than in the 1960s. If we consider only
labour and capital, we find the balance between factor.
1
Corporate profits of manufacturing increased from 26.6
bill. US-$ in 1970 to 45.5 bill. US-$ in 1973 and the ratio
of profits after income taxes to stockholders
1 equity from
9.3 per cent to 12.8 per cent. See Economic•Report of the
President, 1982, pp. 329 and 331.- 32 -
prices distorted in favour of labour and against capital in
the U.S. as well as in those parts of Europe for which
Germany can be taken to be representative.
I
24. When price signals have time to work out their full effects
on the supply side, such a distortion resulting from
inflation (demand pull or accomodated cost push) must be
considered to have several or all of the following side
effects:
- a decline in the propensity to save;
- a tendency of potential savers to accept and even support
a policy ot substituting social security for private
capital accumulation (Hypothesis V);
- a tendency ot governments to run deficits which - in the
absence of index linked bonds - can be financed by
borrowing at low real rates of interest and a tendency
among governments to spend too much even for infra-
structure investments (Hypothesis X);
- a tendency to invest savings in real assets rather than
financial assets, but not in shares of companies which
require much cooperation of - excessively expensive -
complementary labour;
- a tendency, therefore, to neglect capital formation for
use in production processes, notably where much comple-
mentary labour is required, and hence a slowdown in the
rate of growth of the productive capital stock;
- a bias in favour of labour saving techniques to the extent
that they offer a reduction of excessive unit labour costs
without a corresponding increase in - artificially low -
capital costs;
- a tendency in RandD to pay excessive attention to labour
saving inventions and innovations and to unduly neglect
capital saving paths of technical progress.
25. Eventually, an accomodating monetary and fiscal policy
designed to absorb negative supply shocks (amounting to a
strong cost push) will loose its stimulating effect when
money illusion disappears and inflation reaches.^ its
political tolerance level. In the process of bringing down
intlati'on faties people still seem to have adaptive- 33 -
inflationary expectations. But in this case_jthey_lead to
excessive real rates of interest, at least in the absence of
widespread financial indexation. Instead of positive money
illusion the public evidently has the counterpart of it:
distrust or negative money illusion.
26. In the early 1980s the industrial countries of the West
appear to be - or are - faced with the following
deficiencies
- an inadequate stock of physical capital in the productive
sector;
- an inadequate number of jobs built into the capital stock
and, hence,
- structural unemployment which must be identified as
capital shortage unemployment due to a job gap ;
- a stock of knowledge which contains too many labour saving
devices and has too little to offer to cut the costs of
capital per unit of output, implying the danger (or
existence) of technological unemployment; .
- a reaction among the intellectuals, and also among the
workers, against the capital using types ot technical
advance which often mean bigness ("small is beautiful")
and against technical progress as such, and
- complaints about interest rates having risen too much due
to wrong policies (restrictive monetary policy to fight
inflation) and wrong policy mixes (too high public
deficits).
These complaints and phenomena vary in intensity from
country to country, presumably depending on the permissiveness
of the inflationary policies in the past and the toughness
with which the policy shift is engineered. They also seem to
vary with the country-specific rigidities in the system of
2
relative prices, including real wages .
1
See Giersch (1977, pp. V-VIII; 1979); Malinvaud (1982).
2
In addition, such rigidities, implanted by institutional
inertia, may be the major cause for long cycles in economic
development. See Glismann, Rodemer, Wolter (1978; 1980).34 -
27. The capital shortage must, of course, also be directly
related to the two oil price shocks and to the massive rise
in raw material prices in the early 1970s (Hypothesis XI).
When the real prices of apparently exhaustible resources
suddenly increased the physical and human capital stock had
to be revalued; part of it must have become economically
obsolete at given real wages and interest rates, and only
where these other factor prices did adjust appropriately can
we presume that the data on the available capital stock do
not overestimate the size of the stock, its capacity to
produce, or its productivity. There are no data showing how
much more of gross investment had to be 'devoted to
maintaining capital intact in face of the new set of
relative prices and values. We can only conjecture that the
process of adjustment - and of learning how to adjust - must
have been time-consuming and costly and that during this
period of adjustment the effective flow of services from
capital and labour, as we measure them, is likely to have
become smaller than it would have been without the sudden
and, therefore, unexpected changes in relative prices . Had
these changes been correctly anticipated the process, of easy
quantitative growth - at fairly constant relative prices -
in the years before would probably have been shorter or less
2 impressive . In this sense, the productivity slowdown
appears as a process of repair and repayment.
1
In an empirical study for the United States, Baily (1981)
comes to the conclusion that a decline in the services of
capital was the dominant factor causing the productivity
slowdown. This conclusion is based on the observation that
for U.S. nonfinancial corporations and U.S. manufacturing
Tobin's q significantly declined in the 1970s.
Z
To use an analogy from driving: you may go very fast on a
straight road (Turnpike) and suddenly reduce your speed
when you have to turn right or left at the end of it; but
you can also drive at a more even speed (and possibly more
slowly on the average) if you anticipate the change well in
advance.- 35 -
28. The relevance of the oil and raw material price increases to
the productivity slowdown in the advanced economies has been
shown in empirical studies by Jorgenson (1978), Bruno (1981)
and others. We can-add the observation for North America and
Europe that the slowdown was much more pronounced
in heavy manufacturing than in light manufacturing where
energy consumption per unit of output is significantly lower,
and that in the U.S. the productivity of mining activities
sharply decreased when the oil price shock offered incentives
to re-open already exploited wells and to increase production
from marginal oil, gas, and coal fields (Table 12) .
29. Roughly at the same time, governments found themselves under
increasing pressure to take measures protecting the environ-
ment and to improving health and safety standards in industry
and construction. This clearly meant absorbing inputs without
2
increasing measured output (Hypothesis XII) , and as the
professional discussion in the vast literature on the theory
3
and practice of environmental control indicates , the inputs
1
In contrast to the United States, in Europe productivity in
the production of crude petroleum and natural gas advanced
faster after 1973 than before. Until recently, Western
Europe had never been a major producer of these items.
Arter 1973, increased production originated mainly from the
development of (intramarginal) new fields, in particular in
the North Sea.
2
In 1977, in German industry an average share of 4 per cent
(manufacturing: 4.9 p.c.) of total investment was devoted
to environmental protection. 0± course, there is a wide
spread among individual industries where clothing (0.6 p.c.)
and mineral oil refineries (22.2 p.c.) mark the extremes.
3
Haveman and Christiansen (1981, p. 74) attribute 8 to 12
per cent of the slowdown in U.S. productivity to environ-
mental regulations. See also Anderson et al. (1977); Tolley,
Graves, Glenn (1981); Tietenberg (1982).- 36 -
Table 12 - The Growth of Labour Productivity by Industry and Region, 1966 to 1979 (average annual rate of change; p.c.)
ISIC-No. Branch of Activity
210 Coal mining
220 Crude petroleum and natural
gas
230 Metal ore mining
290 Other mining
2 Mining and quarrying
31 Food, beverages, tobacco
321 Textiles
322-324 Wearing apparel, leather and
footwear
33 Wood products and furniture
34 Paper,.printing and
publishing
341 Paper and paper products
35 Chemical, petroleum, plastic
products
353-354 Petroleum and coal products
355-356 Rubber and plastic products
36 Non-metallic mineral
products
37 Basic metal industries




































































































































































































































aData for the EEC include for the whole period covered Denmark, Ireland, and the United Kingdom. - Pre 1973 data exclude
Denmark, Ireland, and the United Kingdom. -
 cProduction. -
 dISIC-Nos. 31-33, 342, 355-56, 39. -


























Source: UN, Yearbook of Industrial Statistics, New York, 1980 and 1981.- 37 -
were not as efficiently used as they could have been had
governments not intervened with' direct regulations but with
close substitutes to market signals that would have allowed
the full use of knowledge available on the spot and a careful
balancing of costs and benefits in the great variety of
given circumstances. What the public legitimately demanded
after a period of fast quantitative growth was a new public
good called "qualititative growth" . Like every new good it
was expensive; but as no price tag was attached to it it met
with a high demand in the political market. Since it was and
is not produced under competitive pressures its social cost
must be presumed to be rather high. After a while, societies
will have learned to produce it more cheaply and to redirect
some of the resources from unmeasured to measured output.
30. A misallocation of investment resources may have resulted
from other, forms of government interference including
measures to promote RandD and controls and subsidies to
protect senile industries (Hypothesis XII). As to RandD
activities it has been asserted that their social returns
2 tend to exceed the private returns by a significant margin ,
but it is impossible to determine what size, what structure
and what evolution ot public RandD promotion would be
1 - • . ••.;.:•.•-•
In retrospect it may be said that measured productivity
advance in the 1960s was boosted by not accounting for
environmental inputs or that the public"had illusions about
environmental costs just as it had illusions about other
costs of quantitative economic growth.
2
See e.g. Mansfield et al. (1977).- 38 -
appropriate.. What the data show (Table 13) is that public
funding of RandD expenditures in the business sector varies
widely among industrial countries, but that countries with
negligeable (direct) government support (like Japan, Finland,
the Netherlands, Belgium) do not necessarily suffer from a
corresponding poor productivity performance. After all,
governments can only give at other people's expense, and
what they give to promote RandD may well reduce business
funds which would otherwise be partly devoted to RandD at
the source. Heavy government involvement seems to be
particularly.questionable where authorities have a strong
bias in favour of single large firms. Such a bias is likely
since bureaucracies prefer to deal with bureaucracies. For
Germany we have evidence that public RandD promotion is
heavily concentrated on a small number of companies which
are known to be large ones (Table 14), although in recent
years criticism against this has induced government to
provide more RandD assistance to small-and medium-sized
firms .It is noteworthy that RandD assistance in general
has come under, increasing criticism by representatives of
small firms who complain about the paperwork involved.
1 . • :. . .. • -
How important it is for dynamic economic development to
have a good climate for small firms and the creation of new
ones can be inferred from a study by Birch (1981) who
covered a sample of 5.6 million businesses in the U.S. He
concludes for the period 1969 to 1976 (i) that regional
differences in the growth of employment had been due to
differences in the rate of creation of new jobs while the
rate of loss of existing jobs was the same across all
regions; (ii) that two thirds of the net new jobs created
were established by firms with twenty or fewer employees;
(iii) that about 80 per cent of the replacement jobs were
created by establishment four years old or younger, and
(iv) that almost 90 per cent of job replacers can be
characterized as providers of services.- 39 -
Table 13 - Government Funds for R and D in the Business Enterprise Sector in













































































































Source: OECD, Science and Technology Indicators, Basic Statistical Series,
Volume B, Paris, January 1982.
Table 14 - R and D Grants to Industry by the German Ministry of
Research and Technology, by Number of Recipients,



























Source: Deutscher Bundestag, 8. Wahlperiode, Drucksache 8/3024,
Bonn, 28.6.1979.- 40 -
31. Since the late 1960s, all advanced economies have been under
strong competitive pressure from newly industrializing coun-
tries in the field of labour intensive and raw material
intensive manufactures. As a stimulus for productivity growth
this pressure should have been welcomed. Western governments,
however, tried to respond with increasing protection. In the
1970s new non-tariff trade barriers were erected to protect
sectors like steel, shipbuilding, textiles, clothing, leather,
shoes, or consumer electronics; subsidies were piled up, :
orderly marketing or export restraint arrangements agreed
upon . In this way governments and pressure groups from
business and labour slowed down the flow of resources to
more productive uses. Societies thus deliberately refrained
from fully exploiting the productivity potential offered by
international trade. This potential must have been an
important factor in the prior period of fast productivity
advance. In judging the change towards a lower degree of
exploitation of the productivity potential arising from
trade we must, of course, recognize that the economic inte-
gration of the world economy in the 1950s and 1960s had
largely taken place among advanced countries. For Europe it
had been a process of exploiting the scope for an intra-
industry division of labour combined with a process of
catching up vis a vis the U.S. The new competition in the
subsequent period fell together with the end of the catching-
up process. This competition originated in LDCs, including
the NICs; therefore, an inter-industry rather than an intra-
industry division of labour was called for. As inter-industry
adjustment seems to impose much higher adjustment costs,
this productivity potential was less readily exploited.- The
protection of senile industries became, of course, more
acceptable with the emergence of structural or classical
1
For details see Institut fur Weltwirtschaft (1979).- 41 -
unemployment . While the 1960s were a period when wages in •
Europe were low enough to permit an excess demand for labour
and when profit expectations were so high that enough entre-
preneurs participated in the game of pulling labour into
more productive uses, the 1970s showed the opposite charac-
teristics. When labour is overvalued in the market workers
observe a dearth of employment opportunities and they feel -
and are - threatened not only by labour saving technologies
but also by what may be called Stolper-Samuelson unemploy-
ment (Giersch, 1980) so that they (and their employers) call
for protection to maintain employment at given (excessively
high) real wages . • •'
Real wages became crucial where unit labour costs failed to
react flexibly to the increase of unit energy costs and of
costs for raw materials and the use of the environment, thus
enforcing the accelerated economic obsolescence of capital
mentioned above (para 27). In more general terms, negative
supply shocks like those we have experienced at the beginning
of the seventies can translate themselves either into lower
productivity of both capital and labour or into capital
obsolescence and unemployment (the latter implying labour
obsolescence). This is the opposite of positive supply
shocks - like falling real prices for oil, the technological
rent captured in Europe's catching-up process, or the pro-
ductivity potential exploited by trade liberalisation and
European economic integration. If positive, such supply
shocks raise employment when real wages do not sufficiently
guickly adjust in collective bargaining; and higher employment
makes the economy more flexible, perhaps in combination with
1
This term was coined by Malinvaud (1977), but the phenomenon
was already well-known in classical economics.
2
See Stolper and Samuelson (1941).- 42 -
a wage drift and. the high upward flexibility of prices. This
flexibility is a positive factor in productivity advance -
at any given level of employment. If this is true, negative
supply shocks translate themselves into less employment to
the extent that the level of real wages is inflexible
downwards. As a lower level of employment makes the economy
less flexible in exploiting its productivity potential,
productivity advance is likely to be slowed down the more
the more negative supply shocks meet with real wage
resistance. However, the productivity advance which we measure
is the productivity advance not at a constant level of employ-
ment, but at a level which was more or less falling in Europe
and which - in terms of numbers - increased in the U.S.
Average labour productivity must be expected to increase
(faster) when marginal labour (and capital) are eliminated
from the production process; and in a similar vain, average
productivity must be expected to fall (to increase less
fast, to show a faster decline in its growth rate) when
relatively much labour - notably unexperienced labour - is
being added to the workforce. This hypothesis finds support
in Table 11. It shows for the period 1973-1979
- that the U.S. had a low increase in distributable output
per hour, much lower than in any period since 1960,
combined with an increase in real wages not outpacing it;
this went along with an increase in employment;
- that Germany had a much faster increase in distributable
output, as fast an increase as in the early 1970s, but
combined with an increase in real wages clearly outpacing
it; this went along with a sharp decline in employment.
33. These observations can be interpreted in the following way.
(a) Had there been no capital obsolescence or had the
capital stock grown faster,
- U.S. manufacturing could have had the same increase
in employment as it did have, yet with labour pro-
ductivity and real wages increasing as fast as they
did in the early 1970s, and
- West Germany could have had the same productivity
advance which the figures actually show for the
period 1973-1979, yet without paying for it with a
fall of employment.- 43 -
For the U.S. this formulation implies that the increase
of employment itself had no impact on the quality of
the labour services supplied or that such a deteriora-
tion would have been compensated for by the increase of
the capital-labour ratio; for German manufacturing the
formulation similarly implies that the additional
capital stock would have been large enough or quali-
tatively good enough to compensate for any deficiency
which the labour services that were actually eliminated
had or would have had relative to the labour which
remained employed (Hypothesis XIII) .
(b) With the growth in the capital stock as it actually
took place in both countries
- the capital shortage in Germany would have translated
itself more into a slowdown of the productivity
advance, as we measure it, and less into a fall of
employment if real wages had not outpaced the rise of
distributable output (the lower rise, of course, that
would have been achieved had employment been greater).
- the capital shortage in U.S. manufacturing would have
been felt more in the form of unemployment (massive
job losses as in German manufacturing) had the rise
of real wages been as fast as in previous periods.
1
On the basis of a simulation analysis, Baily (1982, pp.
8-15) concludes that in the United States the impact of the
decline in effective labour services relative to measured
labour input on the productivity slowdown was of minor
importance. On the other hand, Perlman (1978) stresses that
the demographic changes in the labour force resulted in a
considerable juvenation of foremen and craftsmen, and that
less experienced foremen had a significant (negative) impact
on productivity. The importance of intermediate grades of
skill for the level and the growth of productivity has been
demonstrated empirically in a recent analysis of the labour
force in Britain and Germany by Prais (1981) . Prais
concludes that under present conditions market incentives
(earning differentials) and formal vocational training may
be more important to improve the quality of the labour
force than on the job training (i.e. experience). See also
Jones, Prais (1978).- 44 -
These hypothetical statements, based on a partial analysis
as they are, of course, are deficient in the sense that they
disregard the transatlantic disequilibrium and its correction
- or overcorrection - in the period under review.
34. Why the U.S. economy showed more real wage flexibility
(Sachs, 1979; Branson and Rotenberg, 1980; Gordon, 1982) or
less real wage resistance, or less inertia in the movement
of real wages (whatever term may appear to be more
appropriate) than the German economy is another question.
The fundamental answer perhaps is that the U.S. labour market
has a structure which is less oligopolistic and has more
elements of (monopolistic) competition. Apart from this, one
may speculate whether three year contracts with COLA provisions
as they prevail in the U.S. are much worse for employment
(or an inflationary employment policy) than the yearly wage
rounds without indexation, as they prevail in Germany in an
environment which is very sensitive to inflation, but still
has adaptive expectations implying real wage inertia. A
closer look at table 11 makes it clear that the supply shocks
had little impact on the movement of real wages in Germany
during the 1973-1975 period; this movement hardly slowed
down compared with the fantastic annual increases of 8.3 per
cent from 1969 to 1973. In the U.S. on the other hand, the
movement of real wages had had its peak earlier i.e. in the
1966-1969 period, and the divergence from the increase in
distributable output was not as great. Labour in the U.S.
thus had already time to learn to adjust to a more moderate
pace, when supply shocks contributed to a worsening of its
terms of trade and of the productivity of labour and capital
in North America.
35. The hypothesis for West Germany - wage movement inertia
pushing up measured productivity at the expense of employment
- has a number of implications which call for observations
to support or contradict them. To shorten the reasoning, we- 45 -
just state where our casual observations (which, of course,
must be verified at a later stage) support the hypothesis.
We believe to have observed
- that it was marginal (less efficient) labour which was
either released or which remained unemployed because it
was thought to be too expensive for what it did or could
produce, a point which, however, may indicate that it was
the overpricing of marginal labour rather than of labour
as such which produced the effect (Hypothesis XIII);
- that it was often marginal firms not applying best
practice techniques which were crowded out of production;
- that firms and workers who remained in the process felt
more insecure under the impact of fiercer competition and
made increasing efforts to restructure the production
process with a view to reducing X-efficiency;
- that firms under heavy cost pressures and a profit squeeze
concentrated on process innovations, perhaps at the
expense of product innovations which appeared less urgent
and more risky and more difficult to finance;
- that in making process innovations firms placed major
emphasis on techniques which promised to reduce labour
cost pressures, a practice criticized by union officials
as investment for job killing ("Wegrationalisieren von
Arbeitsplatzen");
- that Germany has not experienced the birth and survival of
so many new firms - relative to the number of existing
firms - as the U.S. did according to Birch (1981).
Of course, we have to bear in mind, that in the absence of
wage indexation real wages are not the subject of wage
bargaining but the result of upward pressures on nominal
wages and policies to constrain inflation. However, as can
be seen from Table 11, nominal hourly compensation in the
period 1973-1975 rose not less than in the period 1969-1973.- 46 -
The proposition that there was a trade-off between a pro-
ductivity slowdown and an increase of unemployment when the
terms of trade of labour and capital deteriorated vis a vis
the suppliers of energy (and the environment) can be
generalised for the countries under review (Hypothesis XIV)
As Table 15 indicates we find that the international
differences in the productivity slowdown strongly correlate
with corresponding differences in the increase of unemploy-
2
ment . These differences were in our opinion also "largely
conditioned by the degrees of real wage rigidity or real
wage inertia .
1
However, Austria, Denmark, Norway, and the Netherlands had
to be excluded from the analysis for lack of data on tne
change in capital-labour ratios.
2
In the same way we tested the relationship between the
increase of structural unemployment and the productivity
slowdown also for other aggregates (non-farm business
sector, manufacturing). The relationship turned out to be
robust.
3
As to the policy implications we may quote from a published
statement one of us made in 1977: "The clash between
inflationary expectations on the one hand - nourished by
recent experience, the oil price increase, and harvest
failures - and anti-inflationary policies, on the other
hand, would have been less severe, if stabilzation policies
had been credibly announced early enough in the frame-work
of a "concerted action", if governments had encouraged
contracts which make inflationary expectations irrelevant
(index-linked bonds, etc.) and if wage earners had been
induced to accept - for the sake of maintaining employment
- the decline in the distributable productivity increase
which was associated with the external shocks. The level of
employment in any one country as in any region or firm will
remain to depend essentially on whether or not real wages
are in line with productivity". See Report of the McCracken
Group (OECD, June 1977, pp. 247/8). The sentences quoted
were submitted as a dissenting vote.- 47 -
Table 15 - The Productivity Slowdown in Industry Related
to the Capital Labour Ratio and Unemployment ,




DIIE = 0.280 + 0.245 DCL
(0.186)
... and structural unemployment
DIIE = - 0.089 + 0.266 DCL + 0.176 DUE
(0.119)* (0.049)*









Mining and quarrying; manufacturing; electricity, gas and
water; construction. - Symbols: DIIE- Ratio of productivity
advance (real output per employee) 1973-1979 over 1964-1973;
DCL = Ratio of growth or the capital-labour ratio 1973-1979
over 1964-1973; DUE = Ratio of (weighted) average unemploy-
ment in the periods 1973-1979 over 1964-1973. -
 cBelgium,
Canada, Finland, France, Germany,,Italy, Japan, Sweden,
United Kingdom, United States. - Countryspecific: peak to
peak; for exact benchmark years see Annex.
Source: Calculated from OECD, National Accounts Statistics,
Paris, var. iss.; OECD, Labour Force Statistics,
Paris, var. iss.; OECD, Economic Outlook, Paris,
12/1980; UN, Monthly Bulletin of Statistics, New
York, var. iss.- 48 -
III. Conclusions
37. The 14 hypotheses which we reviewed in the light of
available evidence suggest themselves for being consolidated
into a medium term acceleration-deceleration
theorem of the following type.
(1) An accelerated productivity advance could be achieved
in the sixties when long term business investment in
plant and equipment - the leading factor in productivity
advance - was boosted by an improvement in the relation
between expected profits (the marginal efficiency of
investment, the natural rate of interest) and the
interest prevailing on financial markets (the money
rate of interest), both corrected for expected inflation.
(2) This improvement was due to
- Keynesian demand management policies in the U.S. and,
somewhat later, in Europe, which kept the money rate
of interest in check, supported by adaptive inflationary
expectations;
- favourable supply conditions with regard to energy
and exhaustible environmental resources, but also
labour (in Europe: notably immigrant labour);
- economic rents from the technological catching-up
process (in Europe and Japan) and from an increasing
intra-industry division of labour within Europe and
among Europe, the U.S. and Japan;
- a favourable attitude towards technical progress as
it can be expected when labour is underpriced and
scarce;
- scale economies combined with low costs of structural
change under conditions of straightforward
quantitative growth.
. (3) Like a short term cyclical boom, this medium term
acceleration of growth and productivity advance was
unsustainable for the following reasons:
- straightforward quantitative growth was bound to fall
into disrepute after it had raised general welfare in
some fields and could no longer hide its deficiencies
and costs in other fields;- 49 -
- for Europe and Japan the opportunities of a
technological catching up were finite;
- export-led growth in Europe and Japan had .to come to
an end as it was based on an overvaluation of North
American resources and currencies that flooded the
rest of the world with dollars;
- supplies were limited and had to become less elastic
at given relative prices in the fields of energy,
exhaustible resources, and - for Europe - skilled
manpower;
- accelerating inflation, due to (futile efforts or)
tine tuning and the fact that declining supply-
elasticities were accomodated by monetary policy
rather than wage policy, had to be stopped at some
point. .,
(4) Elements of mutual causation which had positively •
affected the acceleration process turned negative:
- while straightforward quantitative growth - with
scale economies and minor changes in relative prices
- had boosted investors' confidence,, qualitative
growth - requiring more structural
adjustment in response to greater changes in relative
prices - made business uncertain.and pessimistic;
- after fast productivity advance had enabled a fast
increase in real wages without impairing employment
opportunities, organised labour held extrapolating
(or adaptive) wage expectations when the transition
to qualitative growth occurred; instead of accomodating
the greater investment uncertainty, organised'labour
in large parts of Europe rejected taking into account
the sharp deterioration of its full employment (or
equilibrium) terms of trade vis a vis energy arid
the natural environment and started a fiercer struggle
over the income distribution, which weakened the
social consensus, induced governments to embark upon
populist reform policies, strengthened protectionist
attitudes, and led to more unemployment or to a lower
productivity advance and possibly to both;
- while monetary acceleration cum adaptive expectations
on financial markets had kept real rates of interest
in check during the 1960s and while it helped once
more when it was used again to accomodate the higher
level of energy prices after 1974/75, a stop of monetary- 50 -
acceleration was bound to raise the real rate of
interest to its long run equilibrium level, perhaps
with some overshooting; and a monetary deceleration
to bring down inflation rates - again cum adaptive
expectations - finally produced the exotic real rates
ot interest we had in the recent past.
38. As to conditions on the labour market that would bring us
back to satisfactory levels of employment we can state: if a
norm for real wage increases in the future were to be estab-
lished on the basis of past trends, the measured increase of
labour productivity in the base period must not only be
corrected for changes in the terms of trade and in the costs
of other inputs, it must also be corrected for changes in
employment. The equilibrium productivity advance, i.e. the
advance consistent with constant employment, must be judged
to have been lower (higher) than what is actually measured
if employment has fallen under the pressure of excessive
wage costs (if wages have been lagging behind the growth of
distributable output). If the target for the future is not
constant employment but rising employment, the wage norm has
to be further reduced by a margin whose size will depend
upon the speed at which employment is to be increased. A
level of employment which was too low for too long a time is
likely to have generated wage induced capital obsolescence
and a corresponding job gap. In order to remedy such a
structural disequilibrium, a long and strong lag of real
wages may be necessary for sufficiently boosting profit
expectations, profits, and investment. The wage lag also has
the function of accomodating the high real rates ot interest
which are required for raising the propensity to save and
for inducing investors to change their technological bias
from labour saving to capital saving methods of production.
This is what we consider to be the policy lesson for Europe
in the 1980s.- 51 -
39. Faster growth of the capital stock and a more efficient use
of it will, raise the number of jobs which are profitable .at
prevailing wages and may also lead us back to faster produc-
tivity growth, comparable - although perhaps not equal - to
what Europe experienced in the 1960s when real wages were
too low rather than too high and when the excess demand for
labour promoted international economic integration,, inter.-,
firm specialisation (intra-industry trade, national and , ^
international) and technical.progress. The road towards a
reacceleration of productivity advance, however, may be very
long and may lead us through a tough period of adjustment
and relative stagnation, comparable to what the world
experienced half a century ago. What can help
to shorten this process is certainly not, conflict, but
.- a social consensus based on common insights, .
- a recognition that present wage restraint is a kind of
investment into more employment in the short run and
faster productivity growth in the medium run,
- a more polypolistic system of wage setting or an
institutional setup which makes the wage behaviour of
organised labour more responsive to unemployment,
- an increase in the effective supply of entrepreneurship,
perhaps as a result of deregulation and a return to freer
markets;
- a credibly announced monetary policy conducive to lowering
the real rate of interest (to the extent that participants
in the capital market presently still refuse to
acknowledge past achievements on the inflation front);
- some miraculous technological breakthrough to promise
higher returns from investment.
40. Would monetary acceleration help? Yes, it would in the short
run to the extent that institutional conditions on the
labour market prevent a quick upward adjustment of nominal
wages and that participants in the capital market are not
induced to expect higher inflation rates in the future. But
sooner or later, monetary acceleration will again translate
itself more and more into price effects and less and less into- 52 -
volume effects. As soon as the public becomes again aware of
inflationary dangers monetary acceleration will again have
to be stopped, and its positive effects on productivity will
quickly vanish. Once again, the advanced countries would
then have to go through a painful process of disinflation
and slow productivity -advance, once again paying back what
was obtained by monetary acceleration. What we predict is
that supply shocks at the height of any future growth cycle
will again aggravate the problem, which is tantamount to
saying that we consider the supply shocks of the early 1970s
not as purely exogenous events but to a larger extent as
limits to quantitative growth and fast productivity advance
which would have emerged sooner or later under conditions of
a synchronised world wide boom and increasing fears of
inflation.- 53 -
Annex
If not otherwise stated, throughout the paper the following
years have been used as benchmark years in the coun^
tries under investigation:
Austria: 1955; 1960; 1964; 1970; 1973; 1979
Belgium: 1955; 1961;. 1964; 1969; 1973; 1979
Canada: 1955; 1962; 1966; 1969; 1973; 1979
Denmark: 1955; 1960; 1964; 1969; 1973; 1979
Finland: 1955; 1960; 1965; 1970; 1973; 1980
France: 1955; 1960; 1964; 1969; 1973; 1979
Germany: 1955; 1962; 1965; 1969; 1973; 1979
Italy: 1955; 1963; 1967; 1970; 1973; 1980
Japan: 1955; 1961; 1964; 1970; 1973; 1980
Netherlands: 1955; 1960; 1964; 1970; 1974; 1979
Norway: 1955; 1960; 1965; 1969; 1974; 1980
Sweden: . ; 1961; 1965; 1970; 1974; 1979
United Kingdom: 1955; 1960; 1964; 1968; 1973; 1979
United States: 1955; 1962; 1966; 1969; 1973; 1979- 54 -
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